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AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL LAW LIMITING
THE LIABILITY OF SHIPOWNERS
T Ha law limiting the liability of shipowners was amended
materially in the past two sessions of Congress' for the
first time since its passage in 1851.2 The fire of the Steam-
boat Lexington in 1848 3 was responsible for its enactment;
the fire of the Morro Castle on September 8, 1934, occasioned
its revision. 4
The uneasiness among shipowners caused by the decision
of the court in the Lexington case 5 holding the Company
liable for the gross negligence of officers and crew, prompted
Congress to enact the Limited Liability Act of 1851 6 "for
the purpose of putting American shipping upon an equality
with that of other nations"7 and "to encourage investments
in ships and their employment in commerce".8  It was in
consequence of an aroused public opinion against the hard-
ship and injustice to victims of the Morro Castle I that
Congress passed the Sirovich Laws 10 amending the statute
'Act of Aug. 29, 1935, Public Act No. 391, 74th Cong.; Act of June 5,
1936, Public Act No. 662, 74th Cong.; 46 U. S. C. A. §§ 183, 183A, 183B, 185
and 189.
19 STAT. 635 (1851), 46 U. S. C. A. § 183, etc.
The Steamboat Lexington burned in 1848 with a shipment of gold and
silver coin on board, amounting to $18,000. The shipowner was held liable
for its full value.
'The Tel. Morro Castle burned on Sept. 8, 1934, off the Jersey coast with
a loss of 135 lives. The owners petitioned the court to limit liability to $20,000
for all loss of life, personal injuries and property damage. The petition is still
pending in the Federal Court, Southern District of New York.
'New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 344
(U. S. 1848).
'Walker v. Western Transportation Co., 70 U. S. 150, 18 L. ed. 172
(1865).
'The Main v. Williams, 152 U. S. 122, 14 Sup. Ct. 486 (1894). See also
Liverpool Navigation Co. v. Brooklyn Terminal, 251 U. S. 48, 40 Sup. Ct. 66
(1919).
8 American Car & Foundry Co. v. Brassert, 289 U. S. 261, 53 Sup. Ct. 618
(1933).
' Public opinion was reflected in the editorials and prolonged series of
articles by James Edmund Duffy, Marine Editor of the New York World-
Telegram, in support of the Sirovich Bills.
'Representative William I. Sirovich of New York, Ranking Member of
the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the House of Represen-
tatives, introduced the bills and sponsored for enactment the amendments to
the Limited Liability Law.
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"for the purpose of protecting the interests of passengers
over those of the shipowners". 11
A review of the historical background to which may be
traced the origin of this statute, and the court decisions
which have construed and applied the law, leave one won-
dering that its revision was not undertaken long before the
MVorro Castle added one hundred and thirty-five victims to
the toll of sea disasters.
The old law limits the liability of shipowners, if the neg-
ligence occurs without their "privity or knowledge", to the
value of the owners' remaining interest in the vessel after the
disaster and the freight then pending.' 2  The word "freight"
is used to denote, not the thing carried, but the compensation
for the carriage of the cargo and passengers.13 If the vessel
is wrecked, no value remains for recovery by the claimants.
The insurance collected by the owners on the loss of the
vessel is not part of the remaining value.' 4
The recent amendments place the owners' liability upon
an alternative tonnage basis, fixing a minimum liability for
loss of life and personal injuries to a sum equal to $60 for
each ton of the vessel's tonnage.' 5 The amended statute, with
its increased liability and the added proviso making owners
liable for the knowledge of the Captain at or prior to the
commencement of the voyage,' 6 exceeds in progressiveness
the laws of other maritime nations. The amendments not
only compensate more equitably victims of sea disasters but
promote safety of life at sea. The increased liability for
negligence and the added responsibility for the acts of the
Master, should encourage shipowners to use greater care in
selecting their officers and crew and in equipping their ves-
sels with safety devices.
Limitation of Liability was not recognized by common
law or civil law. It has its origin in the general maritime
See Hearings before House Merchant Marine Committee on H. R. 4550
and H. R. 9969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) ; also 79 Cong. Rec. 14625 (1935).
"Act of March 3, 1851, c. 43, § 3, 9 STAT. 635, 46 U. S. C. A. § 183.
"Main v. Williams, 152 U. S. 122, 14 Sup. Ct. 486 (1894).
"' Place v. Norwich Transportation Co., 118 U. S. 468, 6 Sup. Ct. 1150(1886).
'46 U. S. C. A. § 183, (b).
"46 U. S. C. A. § 183, (e).
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law.17 In England the earliest legislation on this subject
was in 1734. The first federal statute in this country was
that of 1851, amended in minor respects in 1871, 1875, 1877,
1884 and 1886.
The earliest American legislation upon the subject is
found in a statute of Massachusetts passed in 1819 18 and
revised in 1836. This was taken substantially from the Eng-
lish statute of Geo. II. It was followed by an act of the
Legislature of Maine in 1821 19 copied from the statute of
Massachusetts. "It was in the light of all this previous legis-
lation that the Act of Congress was passed in 1851." 20
Mr. Justice Bradley in the case of Yorwich Co. v,
Wright 21 stated that "the act of Congress seems to have been
drawn with direct reference to the English statutes and to
the statutes of Maine and Massachusetts".
In the debate on the bill in 1851 in the Senate,22 it was
repeatedly declared by proponents of the measure, that the
bill was predicated on what was then the English law and
that it was designed merely to place the American Merchant
Marine on an equal footing with that of Great Britain.23
:Notwithstanding this declared intent of Congress to con-
form the American law with that of Great Britain, and the
fact that the British statute was amended in 1862 placing
liability on a tonnage basis "to establish a more uniform and
equitable method of limiting liability of owners", 24 the
American Limited Law of 1851 remained unchanged at the
time of the Morro Castle disaster.
The history of the statutory law was reviewed by Mr.
Justice Brown in the leading case of Main v. Williams,25 as
follows:
'Main v. Williams, 152 U. S. 122, 14 Sup. Ct. 486 (1894).
'Act of Feb. 20, 1819, Gen. Laws c. 122.
"' 1 Laws of Me., c. 14, § 8.
'Norwich v. Wright, 80 U. S. 104, 20 L. ed. 585 (1871).
= Ibid.
23 Cong. Globe, 332, 713 et seq.
'Norwich v. Wright, 80 U. S. 104, 20 L. ed. 585 (1871). Senator Hamlin
of Maine, Chairman of the Committee on Commerce, introduced and sponsored
the bill in 1851.
4 Main v. Williams, 152 U. S. 122, 14 Sup. Ct. 486 (1894).
' Ibid. See also Liverpool Navigation Co. v. Brooklyn Terminal, 251
U. S. 48, 40 Sup. Ct. 66 (1919).
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"By the common law, as administered both in
England and America, the personal liability of the
owner of a vessel for damages by collision is the same
as in other cases of negligence, and is limited only by
the amount of the loss and by his ability to respond.
Wilson v. Dickson, 2 B & Ald 2; The Dundee, 1 Hagg.
109, 120; The Aline, 1 W. Rob. 111; The Mellone., 3
W. Rob. 16, 20; The Wild Ranger, Lazh, 553, 564;
Cope v. Doherty, 4 K. & J. 367, 378. The civil law,
too, as well as the general law maritime, made no dis-
tinction in this particular in favor of shipowners.
(Emerigon, Contrats a la grosse, c. 4, par. 11.) Nor
did the ancient laws of Oleron or Wisby or the Hanse
Towns suggest any restriction upon such liability. In-
deed, it is difficult, if not impossible, to say when and
where the restrictions of the modern law originated.
* * * But, however, the practice originated, it appears,
by the end of the seventeenth century, to have become
firmly established among the leading maritime nations
of Europe, since the French Ordinance of 1681, which
has served as a model for most of the modern maritime
codes, declares that the owners of the ship shall be
answerable for the acts of the master, but shall be
discharged therefrom upon relinquishing the ship and
freight. (Book II, Tit. VIII, Art. 2.) ** *
"The earliest legislation in England upon the sub-
ject is found in the act of 7 Geo. 2, c. 15, passed in
1734, which enacted that no shipowner should be re-
sponsible for loss or damage to goods on board the
ship by embezzlement of the master or marines, or for
any damage occasioned by them without the privity or
knowledge of such owner, further than the value of
the ship and her appurtenances, and the freight due
or to grow due for the voyage, and if greater damage
occurred it should be averaged among those who sus-
tained it. By subsequent acts this limitation of liabil-
ity was extended to losses in which the master and
mariners had no part, to losses by their negligence,
and to damage done by collision, while there was an
entire exemption of liability for loss or damage by
1936 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
fire or for loss of gold and jewelry, unless its nature
and value were disclosed. In all these statutes the
liability of the owner was limited to his interest in the
ship and freight for the voyage.
"By section 505 of the Merchants' Shipping Act
of 1854, 16 and 17 Vict. c. 131, freight was deemed to
include the value of the carriage of goods, and passage
money. Owing probably to some difficulties encoun-
tered in determining at what point of time the value
of the ship should be taken, and to establish a more
uniform and equitable method of limiting the liability
of the owner, the Merchant Shipping Act Amendment
Act of 1862, extended the provisions of the prior acts
to foreign as well as damage or loss to the cargo,
and provided that the owners should not be liable in
damages in respect of loss of life or personal injury, 'to
an aggregate amount exceeding fifteen pounds for each
ton of their ship's tonnage', nor in respect of loss or
damage to ships or their cargoes to an amount exceed-
ing eight pounds per ton." 26
The British law remains unaltered since 1862.27
The first three amendments to the American Limited
Liability Law of 1851 were unimportant changes in phrase-
ology.2 8 In 1884 the statute was extended to all debts and
liabilities, ex contractu as well as ex delicto, except seamen's
wages, and provided that the individual shipowner's liability
should be limited to the proportion of the debts and liabili-
ties that his individual share of the vessel bears to the
whole. 2 9 By the amendment of 1886, the Limitation Statutes
were extended to all vessels on lakes, rivers and inland
navigation.30
The Statute of 1851, although modeled after the British,
was construed differently by the American courts as to the
time of valuing the owner's interest in the vessel. The Eng-
lish courts estimated the value of the ship and freight at the
'25 & 26 Vict. c. 63, § 54 (1862).
' 18 Halsbury's Statutes of England 355.
' Amendments of 1871, 1875 and 1877.
"Act of June 26, 1884, c. 121, § 18, 23 STAT. 57, 46 U. S. C. A. § 189.
'Act of June 19, 1886, c. 421, §4, 24 STAT. 80, 46 U. S. C. A. § 188.
[ VOL. 11
AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL LAW
time immediately prior to the accident.3 1 The American
courts, to the contrary, determined the remaining value
immediately after the disaster, in the vessel's stranded or
sunken condition.32  This interpretation relieved the owner
from all liability in cases of total loss.3 3 Under French law
the freight abandoned is the freight with respect to the
voyage preceding the abandonment, although this may be
several voyages after that on which liability accrued.
It is significant that both the American and English
statutes were declared to have been enacted "for the purpose
of encouraging shipping".
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Moore v. American Transportation Company 3 4 stated the
benefits which the statute granted as tantamount to a ship
subsidy:
"The act was designed to promote the building of
ships and to encourage persons engaged in the busi-
ness of navigation and to place that of this country
on a footing with England and on the continent of
Europe."
The courts, with few exceptions,35 have construed the
statute liberally in favor of the shipowners."
' Brown v. Wilkerson, 15 M&W 391, 153 Eng. Rep. R. 902 (1846) ; Wilson
v. Dickson, 2 B. & Ald. 2. The difficulty of determining the value of the ship
immediately prior to the disaster, gave rise to the amendment in 1862 placing
the limitation upon a tonnage basis.
The Great Western, 118 U. S. 520, 6 Sup. Ct. 1172 (1886) ; Norwich Co.
v. Wright, 80 U. S. 104, 20 L. ed. 585 (1871). See also Place v. Norwich
Transportation Co., 118 U. S. 468, 6 Sup. Ct. 1150 (1886).
"The Scotland, 105 U. S. 24, 6 Sup. Ct. 1174 (1881); Dyer v. National
Steam Navigation Co., 118 U. S. 507, 6 Sup. Ct. 1174 (1886).
'24 How. 1 (U. S. 1860); see Liverpool Navigation Co. v. Brooklyn
Terminal, 251 U. S. 48. 53, 40 Sup. Ct. 66 (1919). See also Evansville &
Bowling Green Packet Co. v. Chero Cola Bottling Co., 271 U. S. 19, 46 Sup.
Ct. 379 (1926).
' Gale v. Laurie, 5 B. & C. 156; The Andalusian, 3 P. D. 182; The
Northumbria, L. R. 3 Adm. 6; The Passaic, 204 Fed. 266 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913).
"Monongahela River Consolidated Coal & Coke Co., 200 Fed. 711 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1912); Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U. S. 104, 20 L. ed. 585 (1871);
Butler v. Boston & Savannah Steamship Co., 130 U. S. 527, 9 Sup. Ct. 612
(1889); The Florida, 212 Fed. 334 (S. D. N. Y. 1910); La Bourgoyne, 210
U. S. 95, 28 Sup. Ct. 664 (1908); The Marie Palmer, 191 Fed. 79 (E. D.
Ga. 1911); Providence & N. Y. S. S. Co. v. Hill Manufacturing Co., 109
U. S. 578, 3 Sup. Ct. 379 (1883) ; Flink v. Paladini, 279 U. S. 59, 49 Sup. Ct.
255 (1929); Larsen v. Northland Transportation Co., 292 U. S. 20, 54 Sup.
Ct. 584 (1934).
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In The Scotland, the Court remarked: 37
"As Grotius says, in reference to this matter of ship-
owners, 'men would be deterred from owning and
operating ships if they were subject to the fear of an
individual liability for the acts of the master'."
It should not be overlooked that Grotius made these
statements, however, centuries ago, when shipping was far
more hazardous than today.
Mr. Justice Bradley in Butler v. Boston S. S. o.38
stated:
"The statutes limiting the liability of shipowners were
enacted to encourage ship building and the employ-
ment of ships in commerce."
But he added:
"In The Lottawana (21 Wall. 538) we said: 'It can-
not be supposed that the framers of the constitution
contemplated that the law should forever remain un-
alterable. Congress undoubtedly has authority under
the commercial power, if no other, to introduce such
changes as are likely to be needed.'"
In Main v. Williams,3 9 Mr. Justice Brown pointed out
that the statute was in derogation of the common law 40 and
must be interpreted strictly so that the right of recovery
should not be unduly restricted.
In Chapman v. Royal Netherlands Steam Navigation
Co 14 1 Lord Justice Brett very aptly commented:
7 See note 31.
'24 How. 1 (U. S. 1860); see Liverpool Navigation Co. v. Brooklyn
Terminal, 251 U. S. 48, 53, 40 Sup. Ct. 66 (1919). See also Evansville &
Bowling Green Packet Co. v. Chero Cola Bottling Co., 271 U. S. 19, 46 Sup.
Ct. 379 (1926).
'The Main v. Williams, 152 U. S. 122, 14 Sup. Ct. 486 (1894). See also
Liverpool Navigation Co. v. Brooklyn Terminal, 251 U. S. 48, 40 Sup. Ct. 66(1919).0 See also The Pelotas, 21 F. (2d) 236 (E. D. La. 1927).41L. R. 4 P. D. 157.
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"A statute for the purposes of public policy, derogat-
ing to the extent of injustice from the legal rights of
the individual parties, should be so construed as to do
the least possible injustice."
Circuit Judge Hutcheson, in Be Jacobso,14 2 scored ship-
owners for taking advantage of the statute:
"The purpose of the Act to encourage shipQwners to
send good, first class ships to sea, is defeated if it is
allowed to furnish protection to owners from the con-
sequences of an illy advised and illy considered
venture."
The Court in the case of the Santa Rosa,4 gave a still
more enlightened opinion:
"The statutes are to be enforced in such spirit and
with such liberality as will effect their purpose-the
encouragement of shipbuilding and the employment
of ships in commerce. But such liberality of enforce-
ment should not be carried to an extent that will
deprive cargo owners and passengers of that degree of
care on the part of those owning and operating ships
which their safety demands and to which they are
entitled."
It is regrettable that "such liberality of enforcement"
was carried to an extent which not only "deprived passengers
of that degree of care" but made it far more profitable to
shipowners if the entire vessel was destroyed. The greater
the damage, the greater was the amount of insurance col-
lectible by the owners and less was the remaining value for
recovery by the claimants. Not only was the statute con-
ducive to criminal negligence but it actually behooved ship-
owners to have little to do with the vessel so that it was
impossible to prove their "privity and knowledge".
The United States Supreme Court, in Place v. Norwich
Transportation Company,44 held in a five to four decision by
4'52 F. (2d) 179 (S. D. Tex. 1931).
'3249 Fed. 160 (N. D. Cal. 1918).
" Place v. Norwich Transportation Co., 118 U. S. 468, 6 Sup. Ct. 1150(1886).
1936 ]
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Mr. Justice Bradley, that insurance collected by shipowners
on the vessel is not part of the remaining value for which
they are liable. Mr. Justice Matthews declared in the more
just dissenting opinion:
"The statute as it has been construed, puts a premium
on the destruction of property by taking away from
the shipowners a principal motive for regarding either
their own and the interests of others."
The logic and conclusions of the majority opinion were
criticized in later decisions and followed reluctantly.45
The statute limiting the liability of shipowners, prior to
its amendment by the Acts of August 29, 1935 46 and June 6,
1936,47 reads as follows: 48
"Section 183. The liability of the owner of any ves-
sel, for any embezzlement, loss, or destruction, by any
person, of any property, goods, or merchandise,
shipped or put on board of such vessel, or for any loss,
damage or injury by collision, or for any act, matter,
or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture, done, occasioned,
or incurred without the privity, or knowledge of such
owner or owners, shall in no case exceed the amount
or value of the interest of such owner in such vessel,
and her freight then pending."
The amendment of August 29, 1935, added a proviso to
Section 183 which was clarified by the Act of June 6, 1936,
as follows: 49
"(b) In the case of any seagoing vessel, if the amount
of the owner's liability as limited under subsection
"The Princess Sophia, 61 F. (2d) 339, 354 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932), cert.
denied, 288 U. S. 604, 53 Sup. Ct. 396 (1933) ; St. Louis & Tenn. River Packet
Co., 266 Fed. 919 (E. D. Mo. 1920); Phillips v. Clyde Steamship Co., 17 F.
(2d) 250 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927). See also Craig v. Continental Ins. Co.,
141 U. S. 638, 12 Sup. Ct. 97 (1891).
"Act of Aug. 29, 1935, Public Act No. 391, 74th Cong.; Act of June 5,
1936, Public Act No. 662, 74th Cong.; 46 U. S. C. A. §§ 183, 183A, 183B,
185 and 189.4T Ibid.
's46 U. S. C. A. § 183, (a).
4- 46 U. S. C. A. § 183, (b).
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(2) is insufficient to pay all losses in full, and the
portion of such amount applicable to the payment of
losses in respect of loss of life or bodily injury is less
than $60 per ton of such vessel's tonnage, such portion
shall be increased to an amount equal to $60 per ton,
to be available only for the payment of losses in
respect of loss of life or bodily injury. If such portion
so increased is insufficient to pay such losses in full,
they shall be paid therefrom in proportion to their
respective amounts."
Under this amendment, limitation of liability would
operate as declared by the Chairman of the Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries in his report on the bill to
the House of Representatives: 50
"If under the old law the sum available for the pay-
:nent of all claims should be $20,000, (such sum being
the amount paid into court by the owner, or in case
the owner has elected to surrender his vessel to a
trustee, the proceeds of the sale of the vessel by the
trustee,) the cargo claimants and the claimants for
loss of life and bodily injury would be entitled to
share pro rata. in such sum. Hence it would be deter-
mined at some stage of the limitation of liability pro-
ceedings from the number and amounts of loss of life,
bodily injury, and cargo claims, what portion of the
$20,000 would be applicable to the payment of claims
for loss of life and bodily injury. When that portion
is determined, if it is found that it is less than an
amount equal to 60 for each ton of the vessel, such
portion must be increased to an'amount equal to $60
per ton, and as so increased would be available only
for the payment of loss of life and bodily injury
claims. The portion of the $20,000 found applicable
to the payment of cargo claims would remain just as
it was under the old law. Hence, if the tonnage of
the vessel were 1,000 tons, and the amount available
WH. . REP. No. 2517, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
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for distribution under the old law were $20,000, and
the amount of approved loss of life and bodily injury
claims were $60,000, and the amount of approved
cargo claims were $20,000, three-fourths of the $20,000
available for distribution, i. e., $15,000, would be
applicable to the payment of loss of life and bodily
injury claims, and one-fourth of the $20,000 available
for distribution, i. e., $5,000, would be applicable to
the payment of cargo claims. The cargo claimants
would receive $5,000, the amount they would have
received under the old law, but the loss of life and
bodily injury claimants would be paid in full, i. e.,
$60,000, because the 15,000 applicable to the payment
of their claims is less than $60 per ton of the vessel's
tonnage, and under subsection (b) must be increased
to that amount. If it should be determined under the
old law that the portion of the amount available for
distribution applicable to the payment of claims for
loss of life and bodily injury is more than an amount
equal to $60 per ton, subsection (b) will not operate.
In other words, in cases where the owner is permitted
to limit his liability, subsection (b) guarantees to loss
of life and bodily injury claimants at least $60 per
ton."
The correct interpretation of the new law therefore
requires the claimants for loss of life and personal injuries
to share pro rata with the property claimants in the remain-
ing value of the vessel, and, should the total share of the
claimants for loss of life and personal injuries not aggregate
a sum equal to $60 for each ton of the vessel's tonnage, the
owners are required to make up the difference out of their
other assets. The share of property claimants remains un-
changed. 51
Section (c) of the amended statute 52 provides the
method for computing the tonnage of a vessel for the purpose
l In the Morro Castle case, the liability, if limited, under the new law
would have been about $700,000 instead of the $20,000 for which the owners
petitioned; and in the Mohawk, the liability, if limited, would have been about
$350,000 instead of the $10,000 deposited.46 U. S. C. A. § 183, (c).
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of the $60 per ton minimum liability; the gross tonnage of
steam vessels, without deduction for engine room space, and
the registered tonnage of sailing vessels with deduction of
any space occupied by seamen and appropriated to their use.
Section (d) 53 provides that the owner of a seagoing
vessel shall be liable in respect of loss of life and bodily
injury arising on distinct occasions to the same extent as if
no other loss of life or bodily injury had arisen.
The statute is made applicable to foreign in addition to
American vessels, although this change is merely a codifica-
tion of existing law. The courts have held the limitation of
liability provisions applicable to foreign vessels as far back
as 1881 in the case of The Scotland 54 and in the more recent
cases of The Titanic,55 Vestris,5 6 and The Princess Sophia.Y7
The laws of all countries recognize the principle of limi-
tation of shipowners' liability. The minimum liability pro-
vided by the amended statute makes the liability under
American law greater than that of all other nations. While
the British place liability entirely on a tonnage basis, the
American statute still allows the remaining value of the
vessel to claimants if worth more than $60 per ton. Under
the French law, the owner's personal responsibility is lim-.
ited by abandonment of the ship and the freight to claimants.
Under German law, the shipowner has no personal responsi-
bility. The laws of Italy, Japan, Greece, Roumania and
many South American countries appear to be derived from
the French. Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, and some other countries have
adopted the Brussels Convention of 1922 which limits liabil-
ity in any event to eight pounds per ton with respect to
claims other than those for personal injury and loss of life,
and an additional eight pounds per ton with respect to the
-46 U. S. C. A. § 183, (d).
"The Scotland, 105 U. S. 24, 6 Sup. Ct. 1174 (1881); Dyer v. National
Steam Navigation Co., 118 U. S. 507, 6 Sup. Ct. 1174 (1886).
209 Fed. 501 (S. D. N. Y. 1913).
60 F. (2d) 273 (S. D. N. Y. 1932).
" The Princess Sophia, 61 F. (2d) 339, 354 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932), cert.
denied, 288 U. S. 604, 53 Sup. Ct. 396 (1933) ; St. Louis & Tenn. River Packet
Co., 266 Fed. 919 (E. D. Mo. 1920); Phillips v. Clyde Steamship Co., 17 F.
(2d) 250 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927). See also Craig v. Continental Ins. Co., 141
U. S. 638, 12 Sup. Ct. 97 (1891).
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latter class of claims. In other words, the American mini-
mum is almost the maximum under many of the foreign laws.
It cannot be said that the increased liability under
American law places American shipowners at a disadvantage
with foreign competitors, since the American statute is
equally applicable to any foreign vessel within the American
admiralty jurisdiction.
The United States is now the only country making ship-
owners liable for the acts of their masters. The acts of the
captain, heretofore, even when criminally negligent, were
not chargeable to the owners.
Subsection (e) 58 of the amended statute provides:
"In respect of loss of life or bodily injury the privity
or knowledge of the master of a seagoing vessel or of
the superintendent or managing agent of the owner
thereof, at or prior to the commencement of each
voyage, shall be deemed conclusively the privity or
knowledge of the owner of such vessel."
The glaring need for this reform was emphasized by the
conviction of the acting captain of the Morro Castle for
criminal negligence; yet, under the old law, a master's
knowledge of the vessel's unseaworthiness was not charge-
able to his owners. Unless "privity and knowledge" of the
owners themselves could be proved under the old law, liabil-
ity could be limited notwithstanding the captain's criminal
negligence. 9 The privity of superintendents and managing
agents has already been held by numerous decisions to be the
privity or knowledge of the owner,10 while other Judges have
held to the contrary on the ground that the mere designation
46 U. S. C. A. § 183, (e).
The Geo. W. Pratt, 76 F. (2d) 902 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); The Princess
Sophia, 61 F. (2d) 339 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932), cert. denied, 288 U. S. 604,
53 Sup. Ct. 396 (1933); American Hawaiian S. S. Co. v. Pacific S. S. Co.,
41 F. (2d) 718 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930); Old Dominion Steamship Co., 115 Fed.
845 (E. D. N. C. 1902); The Pontin Brothers, 42 F. (2d) 556 (E. D. N. Y.
1930), decree modified, 47 F. (2d) 595 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
'Craig v. Continental Ins. Co., 141 U. S. 638, 12 Sup. Ct. 97 (1891);
The James Horan, 78 F. (2d) 870 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935); The Vestris, 60 F.
(2d) 273 (S. D. N. Y. 1932).
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of "superintendent" is not enough."1 The amended statute
is declaratory of the affirmative rule.
When the shipowner is a corporation, the privity or
knowledge must be that of the managing agents of the cor-
poration, or superintendent.6 2 A managing officer is "not
necessarily one of the head executive officers, but is anyone
to whom the corporation has committed the general manage-
ment or general superintendence of the whole or a particular
part of its business".6 3  The test "is not as to their being
officers in the strict sense but as to the largeness of their
authority". 64
The following have been held to be managing agents or
superintendents for whose privity and knowledge the owners
were liable prior to the recent amendment: the "president" ;65
"works manager"; 66 "assistant manager" who "had the man-
aging of the entire fleet"; 67 "one who managed the business
of the line at one end"; 68 "sole manager" of an only vessel; 69
"superintendent managing entire fleet in remote waters"; 70
"general superintendent"; 71 "night superintendent"; 72
"plant superintendent"; 73 "superintendent of a depart-
0I Pocomoke Guano Co. v. Eastern Transportation Co., 285 Fed. 7 (C. C.
A. 4th, 1922); The Erie Lighter, 250 Fed. 490 (D. N. J. 1918).
' The South Coast, 71 F. (2d) 891, cert. denied, 293 U. S. 627, 55 Sup. Ct.
66 (1935) ; The Princess Sophia, 61 F. (2d) 339 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932), cert.
denied, 288 U. S. 604, 53 Sup. Ct. 396 (1933); Craig v. Continental Ins. Co.,
141 U. S. 638, 12 Sup. Ct. 97 (1891); The Colima, 82 Fed. 665 (S. D. N. Y.
1897); Wessel, Duval & Co. v. Charleston Lighterage & Transfer Co., 25 F.
(2d) 126 (E. D. S. C. 1928).
The Erie Lighter, 250 Fed. 490 (D. N. J. 1918).
' Re P. Sanford Ross, 204 Fed. 248 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913).
' Weisshaar v. Kimball S. S. Co., 128 'Fed. 397 (C. C. A. 9th, 1904),
cert. denied, 194 U. S. 638, 24 Sup. Ct. 859 (1904); The Republic, 61 Fed. 109
(C. C. A. 2d, 1894).
'Spencer Kellogg & Sons v. Hicks (Linseed King), 285 U. S. 502,
52 Sup. Ct. 450 (1932).
'Boston Towboat Co. v. Darrow-Mann Co., 276 Fed. 778 (C. C. A. 1st,
1921), cert. denied, 258 U. S. 620, 42 Sup. Ct. 272 (1922).
'Re Jeremiah Smith & Sons, 193 Fed. 395 (C. C. A. 2d, 1911).
'The Benjamin Noble, 244 Fed. 95 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917), aft'd, 249 U. S.
334, 39 Sup. Ct. 292 (1919).
" Parsons v. Empire Transp., 111 Fed. 202 (C. C. A. 9th, 1901), cert.
denied, 183 U. S. 699, 22 Sup. Ct. 946 (1901).
Sanbern v. Wright & Cobb Lighterage Co., 171 Fed. 449 (S. D. N. Y.
1909), aff'd, 179 Fed. 1021 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910) ; Eastern S. S. Corp. v. Great
Lakes Dredge & D. Co., 256 Fed. 497 (C. C. A. 1st, 1919).
'The James Horan, 78 F. (2d) 870 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935).
Spencer Kellogg Co. v. Hicks, 285 U. S. 502, 52 Sup. Ct. 450 (1932).
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ment"; 74 "marine superintendent"; 75 "manager and super-
tendent".7 6
The following have been held not to be persons whose
privity or knowledge was that of an incorporated shipowner:
"marine inspector in charge of salvage operations"; 77 "ma-
rine engineer and inspector" who was a foreman in charge of
river boats; 78 "supervising engineer of repairs"; 79 "local
freight and passenger agent"; 80 "shore captain" referred to
as "superintendent?; 81 "one in sole charge of a tender"; 82
"superintendent of dredging and assistant to the secretary
and treasurer"; 83 "superintending engineer"; "port engi-
neer,.
8 4
The shipowner's right to limit liability under the pres-
ent law is contingent upon his liability having been incurred
without his own privity or knowledge and without the priv-
ity or knowledge of the Master, superintendent or managing
agent. The use of the word "agent" instead of "officer" in
the statute was intended to enlarge the scope of persons
whose knowledge may be chargeable to the owners. The
shipowner has the burden of proving lack of privity or
knowledge although the claimant has the affirmative issue of
proving negligence and consequent liability."5 Under the
"' Re P. Sanford Ross, 204 Fed. 248 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913).
'Re Pennsylvania R. R., 48 F. (2d) 559 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931), cert. denied,
284 U. S. 640 (1931) ; The Erie Lighter, 250 Fed. 490 (D. N. J. 1918) ; The
Vestris, 60 F. (2d) 273 (S. D. N. Y. 1932).
"" Oregon Round Lumber Co. v. Portland & Asiatic S. S. Co., 162 Fed.
912 (D. Ore. 1908); Fred E. Hasler, 65 F. (2d) 589 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
Craig v. Continental Ins. Co., 141 U. S. 638, 12 Sup. Ct. 97 (1891).
" The Annie Faxon, 75 Fed. 312 (C. C. A. 9th, 1896).
7* The Columbia, 25 F. (2d) 516 (E. D. N. Y. 1927), affd, 25 F. (2d)
518 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928).
' The Princess Sophia, 278 Fed. 180 (W. D. Wash. 1921), aff'd, 61 F.
(2d) 339 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932), cert. denied, 288 U. S. 604, 53 Sup. Ct. 396(1933) ; Brace v. Canadian Pacific Ry., 288 U. S. 604, 53 Sup. Ct. 396 (1933).
' Pocomoke Guano Co. v. Eastern Transportation Co., 285 Fed. 7 (C. C.
A. 4th, 1922).
' California Yacht Club v. Johnson, 65 F. (2d) 245 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933).
Re Eastern Dredging Co., 159 Fed. 541 (D. Mass. 1906).
'M'Gill v. Michigan S. S. Co., 144 Fed. 788 (C. C. A. 9th, 1906), cert.
denied, 203 U. S. 593, 27 Sup. Ct. 782 (1906).
' United States v. Eastern Transportation Co., 59 F. (2d) 984 (C. C. A.
2d, 1932); The Santa Rosa, 249 Fed. 160 (N. D. Cal. 1918); The Cabo
Hatteras, 5 F. Supp. 725 (S. D. N. Y. 1933); The 84-H, 296 Fed. 427
(C. C. A. 2d, 1923); The Vestris, 60 F. (2d) 273 (S. D. N. Y. 1932); The
Reichert Towing Line, 251 Fed. 214, 217 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918), cert. denied, 248
U. S. 565, 39 Sup. Ct. 9 (1918).
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British statute the condition for limiting liability is still
that the negligence be without the "actual fault or privity"
of the owners.8 6
The amended statute does not specify what circum-
stances will warrant a finding of privity or knowledge, nor
is it possible to give an all-inclusive definition of the words.8 7
The question as to the existence of privity or knowledge is
primarily a question of fact.8 8 The amendment, however,
establishes more clearly than before that the finding of
knowledge may be "constructive" as well as "actual".89
The words "privity and knowledge", although often held
to mean "actual knowledge and not merely constructive",
were imputed to shipowners in many cases even prior to the
amendment, upon proof of such a remissness of duty that
the law implied privity or knowledge.
Judge Sawyer, in the early case of Lord v. Goodll,
Yelson. & Perkins Steamship Co.,9° defined the words as
follows:
"As used in the statute, the meaning of the words
'privity or knowledge', evidently, is a personal par-
ticipation of the owner in some fault, or act of negli-
gence, causing or contributing to the loss, or some
personal knowledge or means of knowledge, of which
he is bound to avail himself, of a contemplated loss,
or of a condition of things likely to produce or con-
tribute to the loss, without adopting appropriate
means to prevent it. There must be some personal
concurrence, or some fault or negligence on the part
of the owner himself, or in which he personally par-
18 Halsbury's Statutes of England 355.
' See La Bourgoyne, 210 U. S. 95, 28 Sup. Ct. 664 (1908); Re Eastern
Transportation Co., 37 F. (2d) 355 (D. M. 1929), aff'd without reference to
this point, 51 F. (2d) 494 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931) (the court defined the word
"privity" as "some fault or neglect in which the owner personally participates",
and "knowledge" as "personal cognizance or means of knowledge of which the
owner is bound to avail himself, of contemplated loss or condition likely to
produce or contribute to loss, without adopting appropriate means to pre-
vent it"). See also Hockley v. Eastern Steamship Transportation Co., 10 F.
Supp 908 (D. M. 1935).
Boston Towboat Co. v. Darrow-Mann Co., 276 Fed. 778 (C. C. A. 1st,
1921), cert. denied, 258 3. S. 620, 42 Sup. Ct. 272 (1922).
'Acts of Aug. 29, 1935 and June 5, 1936, supra note 1.
'Fed. Cas. No. 8506, aff'd, 102 U. S. 541 (1880).
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ticipates, to constitute such privity, within the mean-
ing of the act, as will exclude him from the benefit of
its provisions".
That the owner's "privity or knowledge"- must be
"actual" and not merely "constructive" was held by Judge
Rogers in The 84-H.91 In The Colima,92 Judge Brown thus
defined the phrase:
"The knowledge or privity that excludes the operation
of the statute must therefore be in a measure actual,
and not merely constructive; that is, actual through
the owner's knowledge, or authorization, or immediate
control of the wrongful acts, or conditions, or through
some kind of personal participation in them." 03
The Circuit Court of Appeals held to the contrary in
The Republio,94 that privity or knowledge may be imputed
without proof of actual knowledge where a remissness of
duty implies privity or knowledge. Judge Wallace stated:
"A loss is not occasioned without the knowledge or
privity of the shipowner when it arises from his per-
sonal neglect to inform himself of the defective con-
dition of the vessel, the vessel being under his imme-
diate personal supervision." 95
In Quinlan v. Pew,96 the Court stated that privity or
knowledge may be imputed "where the owners give an order
for the doing of a particular thing in a particular way and
assume that it is done or do not inquire whether or not it is
afterwards accomplished", and also "to those who are guilty
of perverseness or of such crass negligence as amounts to it".
91296 Fed. 427 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923).
'82 Fed. 665 (S. D. N. Y. 1897).
' See also The Oneida, 282 Fed. 238 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922).
61 Fed. 109 (C. C. A. 2d, 1894).
' See also the case of Van Eyken v. Erie R. R., 117 Fed. 712 (E. D. N. Y.
1902), where the court said, "It may be, however, that the neglect to know
might be so gross as to deprive the owner of the privileges of the act."
"56 Fed. 111 (C. C. A. 1st, 1893).
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A still more enlightened opinion is given by the Court
in the case of Jacobson: 97
"It is my opinion that those decisions are illogical
which hold that where an owner delegates the job of
furnishing a seaworthy vessel to another he may have
limitation, but that where he tries to make it sea-
worthy himself he may not."
And Judge Hutchinson quoted therein with approval
from the opinion in Christopher v. Grueby: "8
"The duty of shipowners to their seamen to see that
their ship is seaworthy and her equipment in safe
condition for use when she starts on a voyage is a
personal one, responsibility for which they cannot
escape by delegating its performance to another."
It is now, however, clearly the intent of Congress to
make the owners responsible not merely for "actual" knowl-
edge but also for "constructive" knowledge of the owners,
captain, superintendent or managing agents. This intent
was declared by the proponents of the measure at the public
hearings before the House Merchant Marine Committee"0
which resulted in the enactment of the Act of June 5, 1936,
removing the word "actual" from the law passed by the Act
of August 29, 1935. The word "actual" had been inserted in
the bill, unknown to the proponents, immediately preceding
its enactment at the close of the first session of Congress, 100
as a result of the shipowners' vigorous opposition to any
provisions subjecting them to liability.1 1 The amendment
in the second session removing the word "actual" was accom-
plished notwithstanding the continued pressure exerted by
the powerful shipping lobby. 10 2
-52 F. (2d) 179 (S. D. Tex. 1931).
'40 F. (2d) 8 (C. C. A. 1st, 1930).
See Hearings before House Merchalt Marine Committee on H. R. 9969,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
"00 Act of Aug. 29, 1935, supra note 1.
"' See Editorial, New York World-Telegram, Aug. 26, 1935; also articles
by James Edmund Duffy, Marine Editor.
" Act of June 5, 1936, supra note 1.
1936 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
In view of the declared purpose of the amendments and
the expressed intent of Congress,10 3 the courts henceforth
should construe the Limited Liability Statutes more liberally
in favor of the claimants in finding privity and knowledge of
the owners.
The above provisions of the amendments are applicable
to sea-going vessels only. Section (f) 104 specifically excludes
even from sea-going vessels all "pleasure yachts, tugs, tow-
boats, towing vessels, tank vessels, fishing vessels or their
tenders, self-propelled lighters, nondescript self-propelled
vessels, canal boats, scows, car floats, barges, lighters, or
nondescript non-self-propelled vessels". All vessels and such
ships on the Great Lakes and rivers used in inland naviga-
tion, still operate under the archaic Limited Liability Law
of 1851.105
The questionable wisdom of excluding all vessels in
inland navigation did not arise in the minds of the legislators
but rather as a result of the pressure brought to bear by
shipowners who, for almost a century, have opposed strenu-
ously any legislation increasing their liability.
"The statute fails to define what is a "sea-going" vessel;
whether the word "sea-going" refers only to a registered
vessel plying sea waters or sea-going vessels entering inland
waters. Recently, the Steamship Iowa sank off the West
Coast with a loss of thirty-two lives. The accident occurred
at the mouth of the Columbia River. The vessel was head-
ing for the open seas on its way to China. Was the vessel
sea-going when the accident happened at the mouth of the
river before reaching the open seas? It is reasonable to as-
sume, in view of the liberal tendency of the amendment, that
it was the intent of Congress to include all sea-going ves-
sels, whether so registered or whether plying actually such
waters.
The omission from the new law of all vessels on the
Great Lakes and inland navigation, is made all the more
illogical when one considers the development of the statute.
" See Hearings before House Merchant Marine Committee on H. R. 4550
and H. R. 9969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) ; also 79 ong. Rec. 14625 (1935).
a'46 U. S. C. A. § 183, (f).
46 U. S. C. A. § 189.
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The original limited liability law, by express provision, ex-
cluded all vessels in inland navigation. They were liable
for the full measure of damages and could not limit liability
to any extent. It was not until 1886 that the statute was
extended to include not only all manner of vessels on the
lakes, rivers, and inland navigation, but also canal boats,
barges and lighters. There is no consistency for such vessels
to get a preference now by being made an exception to the
provisions of the new law increasing liability when for thirty
years Congress refused to grant them any limitation at all.
Inland navigation, as used in the original statute, referred
to navigation within the body of the country as distinguished
from navigation on the coastal waters or open ocean. 10 6
Inland navigation would, therefore, include the Great Lakes,
the Hudson, Mississippi and other such rivers. The exclu-
sion of all vessels on these waters creates what appears to be
a very unjust discrimination in favor of the particular
classes of vessels. A repetition of the Slocum disaster on
one of the inland excursion steamers would result in the
owners collecting insurance for the loss of the vessel and the
thousands killed or injured receiving nothing whatever on
the vessel's remaining value. Why the increased liability
should be applied to sea-going vessels and denied to the vic-
tims of vessels plying on inland waters, is impossible to con-
ceive. A comparison may be made with the case of tlie
Passaic,107 where Judge Ward stated:
"What shocks the mind (in holding that the railroad
company had the right to limit to the value of one of
its ferry-boats its liability for damages for the death
of an employee) is that whereas full compensation
could be had in the case of employees of such railroad
company killed or injured on shore, often only a par-
tial compensation or none at all can be had in the case
of employees killed or injured on a vessel of the rail-
road company."
Similarly, if there is a collision between two boats
belonging to the same company and if one boat is registered
" The Garden City, 26 Fed. 766 (S. D. N. Y. 1886).107204 Fed. 266 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913).
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as a sea-going vessel and the other plies the inland waters,
the employees of the company on the sea-going vessel may
recover damages under the new law of increased liability;
while the employees of the same company working on the
other vessel in inland waters, may not recover anything
whatever if the vessel sinks, even if the captain is convicted
of criminal negligence; since the first vessel comes under
the new law while the latter is still governed by the anti-
quated statute of 1851. A fortiori, it indeed "shocks the
mind".
The amendment of June 5, 1936, to the Limited Liability
Law changed the procedural provisions of the statute to con-
form with the new law. 08 The petitioner for limited liabil-
ity must deposit with the court for the benefit of claimants
a sum, not only equal to the amount or value of the interest
of such owner in the vessel and freight or approved security,
as heretofore, but also such additional sums or approved
security as the court may from time to time fix as necessary
to carry out the provisions of increased liability. If the ship-
owner at his option transfers to a trustee for the benefit of
claimants his interest in the vessel and freight, additional
sums or security must similarly be fixed by the court.
This same section adds a new proviso requiring the
filing of the petition for limitation of liability within six
months after a claimant shall have filed with such owner
written notice of claim. This removes the harsh injustice
to claimants who, after awaiting trial of an action for several
years, had to await calendar delay again while the owners
commenced proceedings for limitation of liability.10 9
This was not the only instance of hardship suffered by
claimants owing to the matter of time. It was a common
practice among shipowners to incorporate on the back of
steamship tickets, in small print, limitations of time within
which written notice of claim had to be given after accident
to the shipowners. Such periods ranged from fifteen days
to six months and for commencement of suit from three
1-46 U. S. C. A. § 185.
' See Re Moran Bros. Contracting Co., 1 F. Supp. 932 (E. D. N. Y.
1932) on the question of laches. The shipowners were not required to claim
limitation of liability until their liability was established.
[ VOL. I11
AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL LAW
months to one year. Passengers, unaware of such time limi-
tations, invariably failed to give written notice of claim and
were precluded from recovery, even where the owners had
actual knowledge of the accident and serious injuries. The
passage ticket generally has been held a valid -contract
between the passenger and steamship company. This prac-
tice was characterized by Mr. Justice Clark of the United
States Supreme Court in his dissenting opinion in the case
of Gooch v. Oregon Short Line,11 in which concurred Chief
Justice Taft and Mr. Justice McKenna, in the following
language:
"In practice the rule is gravely unjust and discrimi-
natory, and therefore unreasonable. This astutely
worded rule is a cunning device to defeat the normal
liability of carriers and should not be made a favorite
of the courts."
All such limitations of time are now declared unlawful
by the amendment to the statue known by section number
183A: n1
"(a) It shall be unlawful for the manager, agent,
master, or owner of any sea-going vessel (other
than tugs, barges, fishing vessels and their ten-
ders) transporting passengers or merchandise
or property from or between ports of the United
States and foreign ports to provide by rule, con-
tract, regulation, or otherwise a shorter period
for giving notice of, or filing claims for loss of
life, or bodily injury, than six months, and for
the institution of suits on such claims, than one
year, such period for institution of suits to be
'0 285 U. S. 22, 42 Sup. Ct. 192 (1921) (In this case a passenger was in
the hospital for thirty days suffering from serious personal injuries. The Com-
pany had actual knowledge of the accident but due to the passenger's failure to
give the written notice within thirty days, all recovery was barred. The glaring
injustice is emphasized by the fact that in the same case there was recovery for
the loss of a cargo of hogs but not for the passenger's personal injuries. Such
limitations had previously been declared invalid as to cargo by the Cummins
Amendment).
- 46 U. S. C. A. § 183A.
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computed from the day when the death or injury
occurred."
For exceptions to the rule, see Subdivisions (b) and (c)
of this section. 112
There should be no question about the validity of this
statute, since Congress had previously declared a similar
public policy by enactment of the Cummins amendment
which provided that in no cargo case should notice be
required within a period of less than three months. Its
application to personal injuries and loss of life claims would
seem to be a fortiori.
A still more important prohibition against ticket stipu-
lations is declared by Section 183B of the Act of August,
1936, 13 which makes it unlawful for shipowners to limit
liability for negligence:
"It shall be unlawful for the manager, agent, master,
or owner of any vessel transporting passengers be-
tween ports of the United States or between any such
port and a foreign port to insert in any rule, regula-
tion, contract, or agreement, any provision or limita-
tion (1) purporting, in the event of loss of life or
bodily injury arising from the negligence or fault of
such owner or his servants, to relieve such owner,
master, or agent from liability, or from liability
beyond any stipulated amount, for such loss or injury,
or (2) purporting in such event to lessen, weaken, or
avoid the right of any claimant to a trial by court of
m 46 U. S. C. A. § 183A, (b) : "Failure to give such notice, where law-
fully prescribed in such contract, shall not bar any claim-(1) If the owner
or master of the vessel or his agent had knowledge of the injury, damage, or
loss and the court determines that the owner has not been prejudiced by the
failure to give such notice; nor (2) If the court excuses such failure on the
ground that for some satisfactory reason such notice could not be given; nor
(3) Unless objection to such failure is raised by the owner"; (c) : "If a person
who is entitled to recover on any such claim is mentally incompetent or a minor,
or if the action is one for wrongful death, any lawful limitation of time pre-
scribed in such contract shall not be applicable so long as no legal representative
has been appointed for such fincompetent, minor, or decedent's estate, but shall
be applicable from the date of the appointment of such legal representative,
provided, however, that such appointment be made within three years after the
date of such death or injury."
S46 U. S. C. A. § 183B.
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competent jurisdiction on the question of liability for
such loss or injury, or the measure of damages there-
for. All such provisions or limitations contained in
any such rule, regulation, contract, or agreement are
hereby declared to be against public policy and shall
be null and void and of no effect."
This provision stops the practice of shipowners who
provided on the reverse side of steamship tickets that in
event of damage or injury caused by the negligence or fault
of the owner or his servants, the liability of the owner shall
be limited to a stipulated amount; in some cases, 2,500 for
first class passengers and $1,250 for other classes of passen-
gers; in other cases 5,000 at most, and in others substan-
tially lower amounts, in one instance as little as $100. Sub-
division 2 of this section which prevents the shipowners from
depriving passengers of their constitutional right to a trial
on the questions of negligence and damages, was designed
especially to stop the practice of certain shipowners who
compelled claimants to submit involuntarily to arbitration.11 4
A clause was contained on the back of a steamship
ticket not only limiting liability to a nominal amount, but
forcing the passengers to submit all claims to arbitration,
with an added stipulation that the arbitrators were not
empowered to award more than the limited amount desig-
nated on the ticket. Thus, neither the court nor the arbitra-
tors were enabled to consider even the question whether such
limitations were valid or illegal and the claimant was pre-
vented from proving the full measure of damage. The arbi-
tration provision was held a binding contract by Judge Knox
of the Federal Court, Southern District of New York, in the
recent case of Elicofon v. Compagnie Generale Transtlan-
tique, in construing the passenger ticket. Judge Coxe in the
same court shortly thereafter refused to follow this precedent
in the case of Baron v. Compagnie Genirale Transatlantique
arising out of a similar ticket provision. Before the question
" See Report of Chairman of Merchant Marine Committee to the House
of Representatives, No. 2517, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936); also Hearings
before House Merchant Marine Committee on H. R. 9969, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1935).
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was adjudicated on the merits Congress enacted the statute
invalidating all such ticket limitations.
A review of the decisions in justification of this statute
and its validity, would require a special article.
The recent amendments to the Laws Fixing the Liability
of Shipowners, while the most progressive in Merchant
Marine history, do not go far enough.
The reasons for the limitation of shipowners' liability
no longer prevail. The means of communication with vessels
at sea and the duration of voyages in addition to the modern,
scientific devices, are far different. The captain and crew
can no longer embezzle the cargo, which was the original
reason for limiting shipowners' liability against the acts of
their employees. The old sailing vessels of one hundred
years ago have been replaced by up-to-date steamships; yet,
shipping continues to function under the century-old laws.
Sea captains are clothed with far greater authority than any
agent on shore; yet, the common law doctrine making em-
ployers responsible for the tortious acts of their agents is not
applied to shipowners who are not responsible for the acts
of the captain or crew after the vessel leaves port and are
not even chargeable with the knowledge of any of the officers
or crew while the ship is in port with the exception of the
captain, superintendent or managing agent.
It has been pointed out by various government officials
after each investigation of sea disasters, that the old shipping
laws were contributing causes to the loss of life. United
States Commissioner Francis A. O'Neill, after his investiga-
tion of the Vestris disaster, reported:
"A full investigation should be made of the ancient
rules of admiralty law as to salvage and limitation of
liability on the part of the owners. These rules came
into being before the construction of modern, rapidly
moving ships, and before the wireless enabled vessels
at sea to communicate instantly with each other and
with the owners on shore. The ancient fiction of law
whereby the ship itself is treated as solely responsible
for any disaster which overtakes it is, under modern
conditions of travel, grossly unjust to passengers and
[ VOL. 11
AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL LAW
their dependents, and it puts a premium on slackness
and penuriousness on the part of owners in keeping
vessels in seaworthy condition and equipped with all
modern scientific devices for insuring stability, buoy-
ancy, and safety."
Dickerson N. Hoover, Assistant Director of the Bureau
of Navigation and Steamboat Inspection, after his investiga-
tion of the Vestris and Morro Castle disasters, made the same
recommendation:
"Attention should be given to the entire revision of
the laws relating to the limitation of liability and
salvage. The law relating to limitation of liability
grew up in an age profoundly different from our own
and there is no reason why today under modern con-
ditions the owner should be other than liable to the
full extent. This would result in a constant urge and
drive upon the owners of ships to comply with every
requirement of safety both as to material and per-
sonnel."
Total repeal of all limitation of liability may appear
too drastic a measure, but the statute should rightfully be
amended further to conform with the trend of modern ship-
ping. The provisions for increased liability and privity and
knowledge should at least be extended to all vessels on lakes,
rivers and inland navigation which are still functioning
under the obsolete Limited Liability Law of 1851. The
responsibility of shipowners should not even be restricted
to the knowledge of their masters but enlarged to include all
the crew prior to a vessel's departure. All employees, while
the vessel is in port, should be in the same category. The
owners should be made liable for the acts of all officers and
crew before the vessel leaves port.
The Liability Statutes are not the only maritime laws
in need of revision. No other branch of the law is so anti-
quated as the Shipping Act nor as urgently in need of reform
to promote safety of life at sea and to build up the American
Merchant Marine.
ADDLE I. SPRINGER.
New York City.
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